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Using the Wrong Discount Rate
to Allocate a Marine Resource
JOHN ROWSE
The University of Calgary
Abstract   How does conventionally defined social welfare (SW) decline when a
marine resource is allocated over time using a discount rate different from the
social discount rate (SDR)? Utilizing a computational, discrete-time stylized an-
chovy model it is found that, for SDRs in the range 4–7%, using a rate different
from the SDR by three percentage points or less yields small percentage welfare
losses. The largest loss is 3.34% of the welfare associated with the efficient dy-
namic path. More pronounced percentage surplus transfers between consumers
and producers occur as the improper rate diverges from the SDR. Generalizing
from such results is problematic, because different marine resources can exhibit
vastly different demand and supply circumstances. To the extent that the results
generalize, however, they offer some comfort to practitioners who must use a
numerical SDR in a marine resource model. Yet, income distribution issues may
loom larger when a discount rate is selected.
Key words   Discount rate choice, dynamic optimization, marine resources.
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Introduction
Long recognized as important for allocating a renewable resource over time, the dis-
count rate and its role have previously been investigated in the renewable resource
literature. See, for example, in this journal alone, Plourde and Bodell (1984),
Hannesson (1987), Cook (1988), and Sandal and Steinshamn (1997). For a recent re-
view of discounting issues, see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002),
and for a recent compendium of discounting studies, see Portney and Weyant
(1999). Thus far, however, the following question apparently has not been ad-
dressed: What SW losses occur when the wrong discount rate is used to allocate a
marine resource? This question arises because the SDR can never be known pre-
cisely, and an efficient, dynamic allocation path must rest upon an estimated SDR.
Moreover, policy analysts may differ on its size and there may be little agreement
about what rate to use.1
Because the demand and regeneration circumstances for different marine re-
sources may differ enormously, perhaps the question has no single answer. Still,
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Rowse (1990a) examined the consequences of using an improper discount rate to al-
locate an exhaustible resource in a simple, continuous-time model and found small
percentage efficiency losses, even for substantial deviations of the improper rate
from the SDR. He also found that consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS)
varied much more in percentage terms. Rowse (1990b, 1991) replicated his findings
in more complex models.
Are there any similar results for a marine resource? This paper uses a numerical
discrete-time model of anchovy allocation (Kolberg 1992, 1993) to try to find out.
The computational model has several attractive features as an analytical tool: non-
linear harvest costs, price sensitive demands, logistic stock regeneration, and
transparent behavior. Moreover, it is similar to models used to explain renewable re-
source theory (Conrad 1999). Model results yield patterns that are both similar to
and different from Rowse’s findings. Thus, earlier insights for nonrenewable re-
sources may extend to some marine resources, but only with qualifications. The
model is formulated next, then the base case results are set forth and explained. Sen-




Kolberg (1992, 1993) uses a stylized numerical model to help exposit his algorith-
mic approach for solving a general class of renewable resource problems. His model
of the California Northern anchovy fishery has the following form: (1) Letting Xt de-
note anchovy stock at the start of period (or year) t, the stock entering the growth
relationship is escapement St = Xt – Ht, or stock less harvest Ht. (2) Stock regenera-
tion is logistic: g(St) = gSt(1.0 – St/K), where the intrinsic growth rate g = 0.3638 and
carrying capacity K = 3.888 x 106, and stock at start of period t + 1 is Xt+1 = G(St) =
St + g(St). This relationship defines G(St). (All parameters have specific dimensions,
which for convenience are suppressed here.) (3) The inverse demand or willingness-
to-pay (WTP) function for anchovy harvest, H, is P(H) = d1 – d2H, where d1 = 50
and  d2 = 3.7906 x 10–5. (4) Total harvest cost varies with harvest and harvestable
stock (measured prior to harvest): TC(H,X) = C1H/XU, where C1 = 10,315 and U =
0.4. (5) Industry profits are: P(Ht, Xt) = P(Ht)Ht – TC(Ht, Xt) = d1Ht –  d2Ht
2  – C1Ht/
Xt
U. (6) Social welfare in period t, SWt, is the integral under the WTP function from
nil consumption to Ht, less TC(Ht, Xt): SWt = d1Ht – d2 Ht
2 /2 – C1Ht/ Xt
U. At the opti-
mum, SWt measures CS plus PS in period t. (7) Denoting the discount rate by r, the
discount factor is b = 1/(1 + r). (8) The problem is, given initial stock,  X0, to find
the approach path which maximizes present-valued SW over infinite time. The re-
sulting path is the efficient path.2
Defining present-valued social welfare to be SW, Kolberg’s model can be for-
mulated (Rowse 2000) as this finite-horizon nonlinear program (NLP):






å d1Ht - d2Ht
2 2 - C1Ht Xt
U [ ]
2 Whether or not this model represents a reasonable representation of the California Northern anchovy
fishery presently is unknown, but Kolberg (1992, 1993) regarded it as a reasonable representation for
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subject to:
St = Xt – Ht, t = 0, …, L (1)
Xt+1 = (1+ g)St - gSt
2 K, t = 0,¼,L - 1 (2)
X0 = X0, (3)
and
Ht, Xt, St ³ 0, t = 0, …, L.
Letting L ® ¥ yields an infinite-horizon NLP.
Terminal Conditions and Steady-state Values
Terminal conditions are needed to correct for the biases associated with using a fi-
nite-horizon model to investigate an infinite-horizon problem. Terminal conditions
adopted for this work employ steady-state values, which are found as follows. Sup-
pose that the horizon is infinite, equation (3) is ignored, but X0 is fixed, and optimal
allocations satisfy all non-negativity restrictions. Substituting St from equation (1)
into equation (2), the problem becomes:
Maximize SW = b tSWt subject to:
t=0
¥
å Xt+1 = G(Xt – Ht), t ³ 0. (4)
The Lagrangian function is:
 
L = b




where variables lt are the Lagrangian multipliers for the equations Xt+1 = G(Xt – Ht).
For maximizing SW, the first-order conditions are:
 ¶L ¶Ht = b
t ¶SWt ¶Ht - lt ¢ G (Xt - Ht) = 0,  t ³ 0 (6)
 ¶L ¶Xt = b
t ¶SWt ¶Xt - lt-1 - lt ¢ G (Xt - Ht) = 0,  t ³ 1 (7)
 ¶L ¶lt = - Xt+1 - G(Xt - Ht) [ ] = 0,  t ³ 0, (8)
where the optimal values of variables Ht, Xt and lt enter into these equations and X0
is fixed. The optimal values of the lt can be found using equation (6) and then sub-
stituted into equation (7). Substituting bt = (1 + r)–t and simplifying yields:
¢ G (Xt-1 - Ht-1) ¶SWt ¶Xt + ¶SWt ¶Ht [ ] (1+ r) = ¶SWt-1 ¶Ht-1,  t ³ 1. (9)Rowse 246
Let steady-state harvest, escapement, stock, and SW be denoted by HS, SS, XS, and
SWS, respectively. In the steady state, Ht = HS, Xt = XS, and SWt = SWS for all t; thus
equations (8) and (9) simplify to:
XS = G(XS - HS) (10)
¢ G (XS - HS)¶SWS ¶X [ ] 1 + r - ¢ G (XS - HS) [ ] = ¶SWS ¶H , (11)
where all derivatives are evaluated at XS and HS. Equation (11) can be rewritten as:
¢ G (XS - HS) + ¢ G (XS - HS)(¶SWS ¶X) (¶SWS ¶H) - 1 [ ] = r. (12)
Equation (10) relates steady-state stock and escapement, while equation (12) speci-
fies pairs (XS,  HS) for which, borrowing intuition from Conrad (1999, p. 14), the
internal rate of return to the growth of the renewable resource equals the discount
rate. Conrad refers to such an equation as the “fundamental equation of renewable
resources,” here abbreviated to FERR and used below.3
Two terminal conditions are employed. The first assumes that the steady state is
reached by period L + 1, requiring escapement for period L to generate steady-state
stock, XS for (fictitious) period L + 1.4 The second involves finding SWS and adding
its present value from L + 1 through infinity to present-valued welfare through pe-
riod L. To implement these conditions, year L is set at 75; a final year 76, stock
variable X76, and two constraints are added to the NLP: X76 = G(S75) and X76 = XS;
and the objective function value is increased by  bt
t=76
¥ å SWS. 5 Choice of L = 75 is
discussed in the appendix.
The Analytical Approach
Assuming different values for the SDR, the approach involves finding the optimal
dynamic path of the renewable resource through the steady state for each value of
these, simultaneously computing SW (or social surplus), CS, and PS for each path.
Subsequently, these surplus measures are compared with those of paths found using
wrong assumptions about the SDR.
In particular, discount rates of 1% through 10% — in 1% increments — are
used, and ten optimal dynamic paths are found.6 (A discount rate of 0%, which is not
used, raises convergence problems. SW is not finite when r = 0.) Each of the ten
paths is optimal for one discount rate and feasible (but suboptimal) for all other dis-
count rates. Surplus measures are computed for each allocation path under all
3 It should be noted that because steady-state values are independent of the approach path to the steady
state, ignoring the initial stock is justified for deriving steady-state stock and harvest. In addition, be-
cause the problem is well posed, all variables are positive in the steady state; thus assuming that the
non-negative conditions are satisfied is also justified for deriving steady-state values.
4 More precisely, this assumption requires that the steady-state stock be reached by period L + 1 to a
prespecified number of digits. In this paper ten digits are specified, the most accepted by GAMS, the
NLP system used (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus 1992).
5 Terminal conditions are needed for each discount rate utilized; thus equations (10) and (11) are solved
for (XS, HS) for each value of r using MATHEMATICA (Wolfram 1991). Each sensitivity analysis under-
taken also requires finding new steady-state pairs (XS, HS) for each value of r.
6 Other discount rates could be used, but the range chosen covers most plausible real discount rates.
Boscolo and Vincent (2000) also use rates varying from 1% to 10%.Using the Wrong Discount Rate 247
discount rates and, to highlight relative differences, percentage changes to the sur-
plus measures are also calculated.
Base Case Findings
Efficient Harvest Paths
Initial stock,  X0, must still be chosen. A 10% discount rate is assumed, as in
Kolberg (1992, 1993), then the initial stock is taken to be one half the steady-state
stock for this discount rate:  X0 = 0.5 XS. Because the choice of  X0 is arbitrary, alter- -
native values for  X0  are considered below. .
Figure 1 displays efficient harvest paths for years 0–20 for discount rates of 1%,
4%, 7%, and 10%. To avoid clutter, the other paths are not graphed. Table 6, which
lists detailed model outcomes underlying most paths, appears in the appendix. Table
6 reveals that the paths cluster and do not cross; thus paths not graphed in figure 1
resemble paths that are.
All harvest paths display nil harvest for year 0 to allow stock buildup. While
this outcome is part of an efficient harvest path, it imposes large burdens upon pro-
ducers who must defer all harvest for one year. They sacrifice for the benefit of
future producers (and consumers). Eliminating harvesting for a year may, however,
conflict with commonly held notions of fairness, implying that the model perhaps
Figure 1.  Four Efficient Harvest Paths for the Base Case (Years 0–20)Rowse 248
should be modified to prohibit nil harvest.7 No such modification is considered here,
but one possibility is to impose a minimum profit requirement for each year. A sec-
ond possibility is to insist that harvest not expand faster than a maximum percentage
per year.8
Variation of Steady-state Stock and Harvest with the Discount Rate
How do HS and XS vary with r? The derivatives dHS/dr and dXS/dr can be determined
from equations (10) and (11), but they are complicated and opaque. An alternative
approach, based upon Conrad (1999, pp. 9–16, 44–46), is followed instead. Figure
2(a) depicts four base case steady-state pairs (XS, HS), each as the intersection of two
functions. The sustainable harvest function (SHF) is equation (10) rewritten to rep-
resent biologically sustainable harvest, H, as a function of stock X. It is found as
follows. Suppressing subscript S and substituting logistic function g and parameters
g and K into (10) leads to:
X = X - H + g(X - H) 1 - (X - H) K [ ]. (13)
Rewriting equation (13) yields a quadratic equation in H, which can be solved for SHF:
H = X - m + m2 - KX g [ ]
1
2 , (14)
where m = K(1 + 1/g)/2. 9 SHF is non-symmetric and has a maximum sustainable
yield (MSY) stock of 2,297,614 tons. All XS from table 6 exceed MSY.
A second function H of X can be found from equation (11). Substituting model
functions, parameters, and ordinary and partial derivatives into equation (11) yields
a second quadratic equation in H:
r0H 2 + r1H + r2 = 0, (15)
where r0 = 2g(d2XU+1 – UC1)/K, r2 = (d1XU+1 – C1X)(r – g + 2gX/K), and r1 = (d1XU+1
– C1X)(–2g/K) + (r – g + 2gX/K)(–d2XU+1) – UC1(1 + g – 2gX/K). This quadratic
equation can then be solved for the “fundamental equation of renewable resources,”
or FERR:10
7 It also calls into question the harvest cost function TC(H,X) assumed in the model. Not harvesting for
one year, then resuming harvest would likely incur fixed costs to maintain harvesting capital both before
and after the year of no harvest, but fixed costs are not part of TC(H,X).
8 This second possibility forces positive harvest each year because nil harvest in any year compels nil
harvest in all later years. Including such a modification might yield only small changes to the results.
For example, on grounds of equity, Rowse (2000, pp. 522–9) imposes constraints on maximum annual
percentage harvest growth. He finds that, for the base case model with  X  0 = 0.5 XS and r = 10%, impos-
ing 10% maximum annual harvest growth yields welfare that is 98.143% of the unconstrained maximum
welfare. Imposing 5% maximum annual harvest growth yields welfare that is 96.192% of the uncon-
strained maximum. Taking either constrained solution as a base case for examining the effect of using
the wrong discount rate likely would not yield major differences in relative SW loss compared to the
base case of this work.
9 Insisting that HS > 0 and XS > 0 requires choosing H to be the positive square root of the quadratic
equation.
10 Insisting that HS > 0 and XS > 0 requires choosing H to be the negative square root of the quadratic
equation.Using the Wrong Discount Rate 249







Four FERR functions are graphed in figure 2(a), for discount rates of 1%, 4%, 7%,
and 10%. Each FERR is nearly linear. FERR shifts left as r increases; thus XS de-
creases with r and  HS increases with r. This behavior is displayed in table 6. As r
rises, stock XS falls from 2.804 million tons (MT) to 2.597 MT and harvest HS rises
from 327.1 thousand tons/year (TTY) to 344.7 TTY.
Performance Measures
Although SW is the most important measure of system performance, its components
of CS and PS are of interest as well because of their impact upon income distribu-
tion. After the optimal solution to the NLP has been found, CS in year t is given by
the integral under the inverse demand function less the anchovy cost: d1Ht – d2Ht
2 2
– P(Ht)Ht = d1Ht – d2Ht
2 2  – [d1Ht –  d2Ht
2 ] =  d2Ht
2 2. Thus, present-valued CS
through year L is  b
t d2Ht
2 2 t=0




2 2  yields
CS. PS can then be found using SW = CS + PS, or from PS =  t=0
L å btP(Ht, Xt) +
t=L+1
¥ å  btP(HS, XS), where industry profits P(Ht, Xt) are specified above.
Selected base case performance measures are listed in table 1, which is a subset
of table 7 in the appendix. If table entries are regarded as forming a block square
matrix, then each block of numbers on the principal diagonal is generated when the
Figure 2a.  Four Steady-state Stock-harvest Outcomes: Base CaseRowse 250
SDR is known and used. For example, when the SDR is 1%, the optimal harvest
path generates $526.859 million (M) of SW through infinite time, consisting of
$193.976 M CS and $332.883 M PS. Figures are present valued to year 0. Off-di-
agonal entries list performance measures when r ¹ SDR, or the “wrong” discount
rate is used. The figure in parentheses (in exponential or E notation) below each
measure indicates the percentage change of the measure from the corresponding
welfare-maximizing measure. For entries on the principal diagonal, all percentage
changes are zero.
Two observations follow from comparing entries in the first row of the block
square matrix. The path optimal for r = 4% generates SW of $525.684 M, a reduc-
tion of 0.223% from the 1% path. Correspondingly, CS climbs to $202.858 M, or by
4.58%, while PS shrinks to $322.825 M, or by 3.02%.11 The first observation is that
Table 1
Selected Performance Measures for the Base Case
Social Harvest Path Optimal for Discount Rate Specified
Discount
Rate 1% 4% 7% 10%
1% SW=526.859 SW=525.684 SW=522.490 SW=517.702
(0.00E+0) (–2.23E–1) (–8.29E–1) (–1.74E+0)
CS=193.976 CS=202.858 CS=210.159 CS=216.017
(0.00E+0) (4.58E+0) (8.34E+0) ( 1.14E+1)
PS=332.883 PS=322.825 PS=312.331 PS=301.685
(0.00E+0) (–3.02E+0) (–6.17E+0) (–9.37E+0)
4% SW=120.772 SW=121.072 SW=120.816 SW=120.121
(–2.48E–1) (0.00E+0) (–2.12E–1) (–7.86E–1)
CS=42.804 CS=44.877 CS=46.632 CS=48.092
(–4.62E+0) (0.00E+0) (3.91E+0) (7.17E+0)
PS=77.968 PS=76.195 PS=74.184 PS=72.029
( 2.33E+0) ( 0.00E+0) (–2.64E+0) (–5.47E+0)
7% SW=63.757 SW=64.253 SW=64.401 SW=64.275
(–9.99E–1) (–2.30E–1) ( 0.00E+0) (–1.95E–1)
CS=21.813 CS=22.941 CS=23.925 CS=24.772
(–8.83E+0) (–4.11E+0) (0.00E+0) (3.54E+0)
PS=41.944 PS=41.311 PS=40.475 PS=39.502
(3.63E+0) (2.07E+0) (0.00E+0) (–2.40E+0)
10% SW=41.493 SW=42.052 SW=42.348 SW=42.436
(–2.22E+0) (–9.05E–1) (–2.08E–1) ( 0.00E+0)
CS=13.737 CS=14.499 CS=15.183 CS=15.789
(–1.30E+1) (–8.17E+0) (–3.84E+0) (0.00E+0)
PS=27.756 PS=27.553 PS=27.165 PS=26.647
(4.16E+0) (3.40E+0) (1.94E+0) (0.00E+0)
Notes: SW = Social Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, PS = Producer Surplus. All performance measures
are in millions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the optimal solution
for the social discount rate listed.
11 Some absolute and percentage changes in table 1 (and table 7) are so small that focus immediately
shifts to the terminal conditions. Wrong terminal conditions or faulty implementation of correct terminal
conditions could alter the findings.Using the Wrong Discount Rate 251
the relative SW change is much smaller than the relative changes to CS and PS.
Table 7 reveals that this pattern repeats as r diverges from the SDR of 1%. Finally,
the largest SW loss arises when r = 10% is used but the SDR is 1%. The SW loss is
1.74%, the CS gain is 11.4%, and the PS loss is 9.37%. The second observation is
that the SW losses of using an improper rate appear relatively small, even for fairly
wide divergences from the SDR.
The patterns repeat. For example, if the SDR is 4% and r = 4% is used, then SW
is $121.072 M, CS is $44.877 M, and PS is $76.195 M. For the 1% path, the SW
loss is 0.248%, the CS loss is 4.62%, and the PS gain is 2.33%. For the 10% path,
the SW loss is 0.786%, the CS gain is 7.17%, and the PS loss is 5.47%. The largest
relative welfare loss (2.22%) in table 1 occurs when the SDR is 10%, but the wrong
discount rate, r = 1%, is used instead.
To summarize, the relative welfare losses of using r ¹ SDR are very small when
the divergence is small, and small even when the divergence is wide. (Absolute) per-
centage adjustments to CS and PS exceed those to SW.
How important is the choice of  X0 ? Three other values of  X0  are examined.
For  X0  = 0.1 XS, most harvest paths are (approximately) displaced six years into the
future.12 All SW values shrink, but all relative changes remain similar. The largest
relative SW loss is 2.22% when the SDR is 10%, but r = 1% is used. For  X0 = 0.25
XS, most harvest paths are (approximately) displaced three years into the future rela-
tive to the base case. Relative changes in performance measures are very similar to
base case values. The largest SW loss is 2.15% when the SDR is 10%, but r = 1% is
used. For  X0  = 0.75 XS, all relative changes to surplus measures remain similar. The
largest SW loss is 1.90% when the SDR is 10% but r = 1% is used. Consequently,
the base case findings appear robust to the choice of  X0 , at least over a fairly wide
range.
Explaining Small Relative Welfare Losses and the Behavior of Consumer and
Producer Surplus
Why are the relative SW losses so small? Using three very different models, Rowse
(1990a, 1990b, 1991) investigated the consequences of using the wrong discount
rate to allocate a nonrenewable resource and found that welfare losses from using
the wrong rate were relatively small, even when the discount rate differed widely
from the SDR. The results are explained as follows (Rowse 1990a). A small con-
sumption reduction D at time t1 to the welfare-maximizing path shrinks net surplus
at time t1 but allows a consumption increase D at another time t2, raising net surplus.
Moving to the alternate path shrinks welfare, but by how much can only be deter-
mined numerically. Identical arguments hold for other similar changes to the
allocation path. It turns out that many different paths are near optimal, yielding
small welfare losses from using the wrong discount rate. For a nonrenewable re-
source, the principal effect of using a wrong discount rate is to change the
distribution of income (some economic agents receive more surplus and others less)
and the secondary effect is to lower economic efficiency (total surplus declines)
(Rowse 1990a).
The relative SW losses for the anchovy model are also small because many
near-optimal dynamic paths exist (Rowse 2000). But for anchovies, as for all renew-
able resources, the resource stock can grow. Pursuing the above logic, reducing
consumption by D at t1 from the welfare-maximizing path allows some stock growth
12 As before, XS represents the steady-state stock for r = 10%.Rowse 252
that would not otherwise occur; thus consumption at future time t2 rises by more than D.
How stock grows may bear importantly on the consequences of using the wrong dis-
count rate. Slow stock growth could cause mistakes in allocation to generate relatively
larger welfare losses, whereas rapid growth could reduce the welfare losses.
What about the behavior of CS and PS? Because SW = CS + PS, when r
changes, either both CS and PS change proportionately the same way as SW, in or-
der to satisfy this equality before and after r changes, or each of CS and PS changes
proportionately in a different way. Given the complexity of the model, when r
changes and thus the optimal harvest path changes, it is highly unlikely for CS and
PS to change in proportionately the same way as SW when r changes. In general, the
relative changes to SW are small when r changes and CS gains in surplus almost ex-
actly what PS loses, or vice versa. CS is typically different from PS before r
changes, thus the corresponding surplus changes transform into different relative
changes to CS and PS after r changes. This behavior for CS and PS is observed in
table 1 and below.
Sensitivity Analysis
How sensitive are the results to different values of model parameters? In this sec-
tion, several alternative assumptions are used to find out.
Figure 2b.  Four Steady-state Stock-harvest Outcomes:
Lower Intrinsic Growth Rate CaseUsing the Wrong Discount Rate 253
Lowering the Intrinsic Growth Rate
How anchovies grow is potentially important for determining model outcomes. For
the first sensitivity analysis, g is reduced to 0.12 from 0.3638.13 The initial stock,
X0 , is 0.5 XS, where XS is the steady-state stock for r = 10%. This formula for  X0  is
used for all sensitivity analyses.
Figure 3 displays the efficient harvest paths for years 0–20 for four discount
rates. To avoid clutter, the other harvest paths are not graphed. Table 8 in the appen-
dix lists detailed model outcomes underlying most harvest paths and reveals that the
paths cluster, although less at the start than in the base case. Thus, harvest paths not
graphed in figure 3 resemble those which are. Each path exhibits several years of nil
harvest to allow stock growth and, because of slower growth, each path takes until
year 55 to arrive at the vicinity of HS, instead of year 35. XS also declines with r, but
the range is 2.406 MT to 1.661 MT, wider than before. In contrast, HS first rises with
r (1–5%), then falls. Finally, the HS values cluster, varying from 111.8 TTY to 116.6
TTY, a narrower range than before. Comparing figures 1 and 3, lowering g to 0.12
separates the harvest paths and causes three to cross.
13 Lower values of g are plausible. But at less than one third of its base case value, g = 0.12 represents a
large reduction to g, making different results likely. One caution: a smaller value for g must be chosen
with care; model dynamics may change if g is chosen too small.
Figure 3.  Four Efficient Harvest Paths for the Lower Intrinsic Growth Rate Case
(Years 0–20)Rowse 254
Figure 2(b) assists understanding. Reducing g to 0.12 flattens SHF and makes it
more symmetric, lowers the MSY stock to 2,060,640 tons, and shifts all FERR func-
tions left, flattening and separating them. Intersections of the four FERR functions
with SHF yield values for XS which flank the MSY stock. For 1% < r < 4%, XS de-
clines with r and HS rises with r, while for 7% < r < 10%, both XS and HS decline
with r. Finally, the fairly wide range for XS corresponds to the narrow range for HS.
Selected performance measures are listed in table 2, a subset of table 9. Welfare
shrinks overall and percentage welfare losses from using the wrong discount rate all
rise by roughly a factor of 10 from table 1. For example, when the SDR is 4%, the
4% path generates welfare of $32.384 M, while the 1% path generates welfare of
$31.303 M, a 3.34% loss, and the 7% path generates welfare of $31.529 M, a 2.64%
loss. By contrast, if the SDR is 7%, then the 7% path generates welfare of $13.978
M, while the 1% path generates welfare of $12.306 M, a welfare loss of 12.0%, and
the 10% path generates welfare of $13.678 M, a 2.15% loss.
Table 2 yields the following result. In the SDR range of 4–7%, using a discount
rate diverging from the SDR by 3% or less shrinks welfare by at most 3.34%. Table
9 also suggests the correct result that, in the SDR range of 3–7%, using a discount
rate diverging from the SDR by 2% or less erodes welfare by at most 1.53%. In each
case, the erosion of welfare is proportionately largest when the SDR is small. The
largest relative SW loss of 23.5% occurs for an SDR of 10% but r = 1% is used.
What about CS and PS? Notable differences in behavior from the base case oc-
cur. For g = 0.12, prices are generally higher than before, and PS is uniformly larger
as a percentage of welfare. For instance, when the SDR is 1% and r = 1% is used,
SW = $186.303 M, and PS = $165.706 M, or 88.94% of welfare. (The comparable
base case percentage is 63.18%.) Thus, PS and SW are more closely related than in
the base case, and percentage losses to PS from using the wrong discount rate are
more closely related to percentage losses to SW.
In the base case, CS climbs as r rises above the SDR and CS falls when r
shrinks below the SDR. The reverse pattern occurs for PS. When g = 0.12, CS fol-
lows its base case pattern approximately, but PS generally falls when r diverges
from the SDR14 Relative changes to CS or PS frequently are larger than relative
changes to SW, again focusing attention on surplus division.
How important is the choice of  X0 ? Three different values of  X0  are examined,
namely 0.1XS, 0.25 XS, and 0.75 XS, as before. In all cases, the percentage losses to
SW, PS, and CS were very similar to those in tables 2 and 9, some nearly identical.
Thus, the results appear robust to the choice of  X0 .
Raising the Intrinsic Growth Rate
For the second sensitivity analysis, relative to the base case, intrinsic growth rate, g,
is raised to 0.5, roughly one third above its base case value of 0.3638.15 Here and
below, to economize on space, only selected performance measures are listed, and
no supporting tables are provided in the appendix. Table 3 lists the changed out-
comes. In terms of SW, the fishery is more lucrative than in the base case, and much
14 For g = 0.12 there is an exception for CS: as r climbs above the SDR, CS rises and then falls. An exception
also occurs for PS. When r falls below SDR by 1%, PS climbs slightly. As r declines further, PS falls.
15 A larger value of g must be chosen with care because model dynamics may change with larger values
of g. For example, using a different renewable resource model, Conrad (1999, pp. 32–36) shows that
values of the intrinsic growth rate (for the logistic function) exceeding unity yield qualitatively different
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more lucrative than in the lower intrinsic growth rate case. Percentage SW losses are
uniformly less than in the base case and the largest percentage welfare loss stands at
0.848%, when the SDR is 10% but r = 1% is used instead. Previous patterns of ad-
justment are repeated. Table 3 confirms that mistakes in allocation may cause less
relative welfare loss when stock growth is faster.
Reducing Anchovy Demands
For the third sensitivity analysis, relative to the base case, the WTP function is
changed as follows. Price intercept d1 is reduced from 50 to 40 and slope coefficient
Table 2
Selected Performance Measures for the Lower Intrinsic Growth Rate Case
Social Harvest Path Optimal for Discount Rate Specified
Discount
Rate 1% 4% 7% 10%
SW=186.303 SW=180.432 SW=166.138 SW=147.977
(0.00E+0) (–3.15E+0) (–1.08E+1) (–2.06E+1)
CS=20.598 CS=22.432 CS=22.494 CS=21.445
1% (0.00E+0) (8.91E+0) (9.21E+0) (4.11E+0)
PS=165.706 PS=158.000 PS=143.644 PS=126.532
(0.00E+0) (–4.65E+0) (–1.33E+1) (–2.36E+1)
SW=31.303 SW=32.384 SW=31.529 SW=29.459
(–3.34E+0) (0.00E+0) (–2.64E+0) (–9.03E+0)
CS=3.267 CS=3.797 CS=4.034 CS=4.054
4% (–1.40E+1) (0.00E+0) (6.25E+0) (6.76E+0)
PS=28.036 PS=28.587 PS=27.494 PS=25.406
(–1.93E+0) (0.00E+0) (–3.82E+0) (–1.11E+1)
SW=12.306 SW=13.592 SW=13.978 SW=13.678
(–1.20E+1) (–2.76E+0) (0.00E+0) (–2.15E+0)
CS=1.219 CS=1.511 CS=1.699 CS=1.795
7% (–2.83E+1) (–1.11E+1) (0.00E+0) (5.69E+0)
PS=11.088 PS=12.081 PS=12.279 PS=11.882
(–9.70E+0) (–1.61E+0) (0.00E+0) (–3.23E+0)
SW=6.044 SW=7.121 SW=7.726 SW=7.905
(–2.35E+1) (–9.92E+0) (–2.26E+0) (0.00E+0)
CS=0.570 CS=0.753 CS=0.895 CS=0.994
10% (–4.26E+1) (–2.42E+1) (–9.89E+0) ( 0.00E+0)
PS=5.474 PS=6.367 PS=6.831 PS=6.911
(–2.08E+1) (–7.87E+0) (–1.16E+0) ( 0.00E+0)
Notes: SW = Social Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, PS = Producer Surplus. All performance measures
are in millions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the optimal solution
for the social discount rate listed.Rowse 256
d2 is increased to 4.0x10–5 from 3.7906–5 .16 These changes reduce anchovy demands
and render the fishery much less lucrative. Table 4 lists selected performance mea-
sures. All SW values fall to less than half their base case values, previous patterns
repeat, and using the wrong discount rate generates smaller relative SW losses than
in the base case. The largest relative loss of 0.778% occurs when the SDR is 10%
but r = 1% is used.
Reducing Harvesting Costs
As a final sensitivity analysis, relative to the base case, harvesting costs are reduced.
For the harvest cost function TC(H,X) = C1H/XU, C1 is reduced by about 10% from
Table 3
Selected Performance Measures for the Higher Intrinsic Growth Rate Case
Social Harvest Path Optimal for Discount Rate Specified
Discount
Rate 1% 4% 7% 10%
1% SW=654.565 SW=654.098 SW=652.830 SW=650.937
(0.00E+0) (–7.14E–2) (–2.65E–1) (–5.54E–1)
CS=344.486 CS=355.618 CS=365.427 CS=374.128
(0.00E+0) (3.23E+0) (6.08E+0) (8.60E+0)
PS=310.079 PS=298.481 PS=287.403 PS=276.809
(0.00E+0) (–3.74E+0) (–7.31E+0) (–1.07E+1)
4% SW=155.471 SW=155.598 SW=155.482 SW=155.166
(–8.18E–2) (0.00E+0) (–7.49E–2) (–2.78E–1)
CS=79.107 CS=81.696 CS=83.933 CS=85.924
(–3.17E+0) (0.00E+0) (2.74E+0) (5.17E+0)
PS=76.364 PS=73.902 PS=71.549 PS=69.242
(3.33E+0) (0.00E+0) (–3.18E+0) (–6.31E+0)
7% SW=84.856 SW=85.086 SW=85.160 SW=85.096
(–3.57E–1) (–8.73E–2) (0.00E+0) (–7.48E–2)
CS=41.843 CS=43.248 CS=44.443 CS=45.516
(–5.85E+0) (–2.69E+0) (0.00E+0) (2.41E+0)
PS=43.013 PS=41.838 PS=40.717 PS=39.580
(5.64E+0) (2.75E+0) (0.00E+0) (–2.79E+0)
10% SW=56.990 SW=57.267 SW=57.429 SW=57.478
(–8.48E–1) (–3.66E–1) (–8.45E–2) (0.00E+0)
CS=27.291 CS=28.239 CS=29.038 CS=29.762
(–8.30E+0) (–5.12E+0) (–2.43E+0) (0.00E+0)
PS=29.699 PS=29.028 PS=28.391 PS=27.716
(7.15E+0) (4.73E+0) (2.44E+0) (0.00E+0)
Notes: SW = Social Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, PS = Producer Surplus. All performance measures
are in millions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the optimal solution
for the social discount rate listed.
16 Kolberg (1992, p. 25) asserts that the price intercept d1 = 50 “is substantially greater than the intercept
which would lead the model to an open access equilibrium corresponding to stock conditions in 1976.
This was done to magnify the difference between open access and socially optimal solutions of the
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Table 4
Selected Performance Measures for the Reduced Demands Case
Social Harvest Path Optimal for Discount Rate Specified
Discount
Rate 1% 4% 7% 10%
1% SW=227.582 SW=227.431 SW=227.054 SW=226.519
(0.00E+0) (–6.62E–2) (–2.32E–1) (–4.67E–1)
CS=133.464 CS=138.919 CS=143.684 CS=147.809
(0.00E+0) (4.09E+0) (7.66E+0) (1.07E+1)
PS=94.117 PS=88.511 PS=83.370 PS=78.710
(0.00E+0) (–5.96E+0) (–1.14E+1) (–1.64E+1)
4% SW=52.249 SW=52.292 SW=52.260 SW=52.168
(–8.19E–2) (0.00E+0) (–6.20E–2) (–2.37E–1)
CS=29.612 CS=30.897 CS=32.027 CS=32.976
(–4.16E+0) (0.00E+0) (3.66E+0) (6.73E+0)
PS=22.637 PS=21.395 PS=20.233 PS=19.192
(5.81E+0) (0.00E+0) (–5.43E+0) (–1.03E+1)
7% SW=27.665 SW=27.739 SW=27.759 SW=27.741
(–3.38E–1) (–7.31E–2) (0.00E+0) (–6.69E–2)
CS=15.185 CS=15.888 CS=16.511 CS=17.021
(–8.03E+0) (–3.77E+0) (0.00E+0) (3.09E+0)
PS=12.481 PS=11.851 PS=11.249 PS=10.719
(1.10E+1) (5.36E+0) (0.00E+0) (–4.70E+0)
10% SW=18.079 SW=18.164 SW=18.206 SW=18.220
(–7.78E–1) (–3.07E–1) (–7.78E–2) (0.00E+0)
CS= 9.628 CS=10.105 CS=10.530 CS=10.872
(–1.14E+1) (–7.06E+0) (–3.14E+0) (0.00E+0)
PS= 8.451 PS= 8.060 PS=7.676 PS= 7.349
(1.50E+1) (9.68E+0) (4.46E+0) (0.00E+0)
Notes: SW = Social Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, PS = Producer Surplus. All performance measures
are in millions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the optimal solution
for the social discount rate listed.
10,315 to 9,000 and U is increased by 10% from 0.4 to 0.44. These relative changes
are not very large, but the change to U has a major impact upon harvest costs.17
Table 5 lists selected performance measures, and all SW values nearly double from
the base case. The anchovy fishery is much more lucrative, and using the wrong dis-
count rate is more costly in terms of relative SW loss than in the base case, roughly
twice as much, and more so than in the reduced demands case. Some patterns repeat,
but there is less regularity to the CS and PS changes than in the base case. The larg-
est welfare loss of 3.91% occurs when the SDR is 10% but r = 1% is used.
17 For example, the marginal harvest cost for the base case XS when r = 10% is 10315/XS
0.4 = 28.03, in
dollars/ton, while with the altered values of C1 and U, the corresponding marginal harvest cost for this
same stock level is 9000/XS
0.44  = 13.55, or less than half.Rowse 258
Table 5
Selected Performance Measures for the Reduced Harvesting Costs Case
Social Harvest Path Optimal for Discount Rate Specified
Discount
Rate 1% 4% 7% 10%
1% SW=1001.91 SW=997.569 SW=984.745 SW=963.985
(0.00E+0)  (–4.33E–1) (–1.71E+0) (–3.79E+0)
CS=223.749 CS=226.950 CS=225.725 CS=220.691
(0.00E+0)  (1.43E+0) (8.83E–1) (–1.37E+0)
PS=778.160 PS=770.620 PS=759.021 PS=743.294
(0.00E+0)  (–9.69E–1) (–2.46E+0) (–4.48E+0)
4% SW=228.832 SW=229.839 SW=228.829 SW=225.906
(–4.38E–1) (0.00E+0) (–4.39E–1) (–1.71E+0)
CS= 49.089 CS= 50.218 CS= 50.210 CS= 49.468
(–2.25E+0) (0.00E+0) (–1.72E–2) (–1.49E+0)
PS=179.743 PS=179.620 PS=178.620 PS=176.438
(6.84E–2) (0.00E+0) (–5.57E–1) (–1.77E+0)
7% SW=120.273 SW=121.861 SW=122.417 SW=121.895
(–1.75E+0) (–4.54E–1) (0.00E+0) (–4.26E–1)
CS= 24.852 CS= 25.651 CS= 25.794 CS= 25.620
(–3.65E+0) (–5.54E–1) (0.00E+0) (–6.73E–1)
PS= 95.422 PS= 96.210 PS= 96.623 PS= 96.275
(–1.24E+0) (–4.27E–1) (0.00E+0) (–3.60E–1)
10% SW= 77.889 SW= 79.601 SW= 80.706 SW= 81.057
(–3.91E+0) (–1.80E+0) (–4.33E–1) (0.00E+0)
CS= 15.539 CS= 16.186 CS= 16.375 CS= 16.402
(–5.26E+0) (–1.32E+0) (–1.66E–1) (0.00E+0)
PS= 62.350 PS= 63.416 PS= 64.331 PS= 64.655
(–3.57E+0) (–1.92E+0) (–5.01E–1) (0.00E+0)
Notes: SW = Social Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, PS = Producer Surplus. All performance measures
are in millions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the optimal solution
for the social discount rate listed.
Concluding Remarks
The SDR for allocating a marine resource can never be known precisely and must be
approximated in any policy study. Analysts may also differ on its size. Hence, it is
worthwhile to ask: What are the SW losses when the wrong discount rate is used?
This work examines the question using a stylized numerical model of anchovy
allocation. Over an SDR range of 1–10%, base case relative welfare losses are very
small when the improper discount rate and the SDR differ widely. However, using a
much lower intrinsic growth rate, g, yields larger relative losses: still very small
when the wrong rate r and the SDR differ slightly, but larger when r and the SDR
diverge a lot. Other sensitivity analyses yield results closer to those of the base case.
CS and PS behave less consistently when the wrong rate is used.
How general are the findings? For a single marine resource model, examination
of five different cases yields somewhat different results, making generalizations
across parameter sets problematic. Moreover, not examined are outcomes from us-
ing much larger values of g and much smaller values of g, which may generateUsing the Wrong Discount Rate 259
qualitatively different dynamic paths from the types examined here, as well as out-
comes for plausible alternative combinations of the other parameters. In addition,
not considered is a case where interest-rate sensitive capital costs enter into anchovy
supply, yielding ambiguous results regarding how steady-state stock and harvest
change (and thus the optimal dynamic path) when the discount rate changes
(Hannesson 1987). Finally, not considered is a model of the dynamic interaction of
multiple marine species. It is clear that there are many topics for further research.
It is plausible that, for a given resource model, regions of parameter space may
exist for which using the wrong discount rate yields relatively small welfare losses,
but other regions may also exist — particularly where stock growth is slow — for
which using the wrong rate yields larger losses. In some marine resource models,
using the wrong discount rate may yield small welfare losses, perhaps much smaller
than might commonly be thought. Yet the outcome of relatively small losses from
using the wrong discount rate may be model-dependent, and for different parameter
values for the same model, or for different models, relative losses may be larger.
Such results seem consistent with intuition, given that a resource stock can grow
very differently depending on the marine resource and how harvesting occurs.
If using the wrong discount rate incurs small welfare losses, what are the impli-
cations? The findings offer some comfort to practitioners. Provided that the wrong
discount rate and the SDR do not differ much, relative welfare losses may be small.
Even if they differ a lot, relative losses may still be small. Yet the relative changes
to PS and CS may be more pronounced, raising the importance of income distribu-
tion issues for choosing a SDR. However, attempting to resolve competing income
distribution interests may complicate discount rate choice.
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Appendix
Detailed Outcomes for the Base Case and the Lower Intrinsic Growth Rate
Case and Remarks on Choosing L
Although the anchovy model is simple, model outputs are voluminous. Detailed
time series of harvest, stock, price, CS, PS, and SW form part of the solution for
each discount rate for the base case and each sensitivity analysis. Only a small sub-
set of model outcomes for this work are graphed in figures 1 and 3 and listed in
tables 1–5. To supplement the discussion, this appendix provides more detailed out-
comes for the base case and the first sensitivity analysis. Remarks are also provided
on choosing L, the final year of the NLP. All harvest paths are found using the NLP
system GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus 1992), while steady-state stock-har-
vest pairs are found using MATHEMATICA (Wolfram 1991).
The harvest paths graphed in figure 1 are of harvests listed in table 6 and the
steady-state pairs graphed in figure 2(a) replicate the corresponding pairs displayed
in table 6. To compress table 6, harvests are listed only every five years after t = 30.
Harvests are also listed to four decimal digits, with all digits used to compute the
performance measures. Notable from table 6 is the nil harvest for t = 0 for all discount
rates and that no harvest path crosses any other. Further, for all discount rates, Ht ap-
proximates HS closely by t = 35, and by t = 50, Ht wobbles around HS. Wobbling is a
phenomenon of the numerical optimization of discrete-time NLP models using a
present valuation criterion and occurs because the Kuhn-Tucker optimality condi-
tions are solved only to a fixed precision; Rowse (1995, note 3) provides details.
Tables 7 and 9, also found using GAMS, form supersets of outcomes listed in
tables 1 and 2, respectively, and allow examination of the behavior of performance
measures as the discount rate changes in 2% increments.
Harvest paths graphed in figure 3 are of harvests listed in table 8, and the
steady-state pairs graphed in figure 2(b) replicate corresponding pairs displayed in
table 8. Notable about table 8 are the several years of nil harvest initially for all dis-
count rates, the longer time for harvests to rise to the vicinity of HS (namely t = 55),
and that certain harvest paths cross.
Choice of L, the final period of the NLP, is based upon experimentation with the
model. In earlier work, Rowse (2000, notes 12 and 14) examined the efficacy of the
terminal conditions and solved the base case model with  X0  = 0.5 XS and r = 10%
(and subsequently r = 2%) for L = 60, L = 100 and L = 125 and compared the results
with those for L = 75. Model results were the same for all values of L, indicating
that the terminal conditions functioned as desired.
For this work as well, L had to be chosen large enough that the optimal harvestUsing the Wrong Discount Rate 261
path migrates toward the close vicinity of HS endogenously, and is not forced there
by the two additional constraints imposed on the NLP (X76 = G(S75) and X76 = XS) as
part of the terminal conditions. As stated above, base case harvest approximates HS
closely by t = 35, whereas in the lower intrinsic growth rate case (g = 0.12), harvest
approximates HS closely only by t = 55. L had to be chosen larger than both of these
values and to accommodate other sensitivity analyses; hence L was conservatively
set high at 75 for all model runs. As a final experiment on L, the model for the
higher intrinsic growth rate case (g = 0.5) was solved again, but with L lowered to
L = 40. The new solution replicated all performance measures of table 3.
Table 6
Efficient Harvests for the Base Case (Tons/Year)
Year  r: 1% 3% 4% 5% 7% 9% 10%
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 6859.4789 28352.4415 38489.9229 48243.2601 66660.0511 83722.3686 91780.6383
2 112068.4245 125132.8121 131341.7840 137344.9431 148761.8747 159437.4631 164513.3893
3 179451.7638 188117.0550 192233.5265 196213.0309 203781.1317 210859.6661 214226.5649
4 224585.3551 230865.5253 233824.1319 236669.2443 242039.5094 247015.3501 249366.3770
5 255463.7217 260478.9474 262807.4702 265025.1830 269152.3124 272904.9626 274653.3280
6 276841.7303 281232.4400 283238.0530 285126.9519 288581.0944 291645.5949 293046.1870
7 291746.6075 295880.6700 297742.5733 299478.2416 302601.2207 305305.6224 306516.7619
8 302185.5530 306266.9448 308086.7946 309771.1271 312764.9443 315308.1503 316427.6587
9 309520.7907 313653.6476 315486.8394 317176.0301 320155.9562 322655.4661 323742.5718
10 314682.9764 318917.8019 320791.5550 322514.5864 325542.2232 328064.0805 329153.3759
11 318322.4768 322674.8236 324599.5376 326368.7916 329473.4412 332051.8349 333162.0231
12 320889.8508 325358.6186 327336.3934 329154.4502 332345.7376 334995.4414 336135.2209
13 322702.2302 327276.9187 329304.0498 331169.1782 334445.9481 337169.6539 338342.2481
14 323982.3562 328649.2770 330719.9337 332627.0698 335982.4655 338776.8220 339981.5003
15 324886.9717 329630.8811 331738.9284 333682.3220 337107.0314 339965.1539 341199.5799
16 325526.4530 330333.0177 332472.7274 334446.5824 337930.3363 340844.2236 342105.0135
17 325978.3292 330836.8340 333000.6803 335000.0371 338533.1673 341494.7233 342778.1941
18 326297.4846 331195.6088 333381.1693 335400.7758 338974.8097 341975.9127 343278.6985
19 326522.9632 331453.8856 333655.3342 335691.5308 339297.9404 342331.9337 343651.1479
20 326682.5478 331638.6940 333852.0368 335901.0986 339535.2195 342595.7413 343927.8670
21 326795.5734 331769.6769 333995.0874 336054.5350 339708.2439 342790.7306 344133.9764
22 326875.6124 331865.2517 334096.4783 336164.1091 339835.9101 342935.1291 344287.2057
23 326932.2390 331932.7419 334171.0950 336244.7739 339928.5841 343042.1588 344401.0604
24 326972.0910 331981.0849 334223.7213 336302.0650 339997.1200 343121.3371 344485.9387
25 327000.0023 332015.5362 334262.0872 336344.6686 340046.7924 343179.7633 344549.1180
26 327019.6952 332040.8893 334289.4421 336374.7324 340084.0946 343223.6429 344595.8163
27 327033.8590 332058.7543 334309.8761 336396.7362 340109.8412 343254.9188 344630.9256
28 327044.1464 332071.0978 334323.8634 336413.4705 340130.6751 343280.0806 344656.8869
29 327051.4851 332080.1264 334333.6883 336423.9141 340144.2337 343294.9294 344676.4781
30 327056.5688 332087.2706 334341.8192 336432.9712 340154.8935 343311.9057 344689.1193
35 327065.1969 332099.8327 334356.8510 336450.0045 340178.4015 343340.2022 344722.6559
40 327067.5238 332102.6137 334360.3113 336454.2467 340181.5025 343341.9743 344731.2127
45 327068.0935 332104.4722 334361.1479 336453.5652 340186.6818 343349.7890 344729.4880
50 327068.4204 332103.4621 334360.7800 336455.8676 340179.1696 343349.9450 344727.1819
55 327067.5824 332103.9356 334360.4072 336453.8419 340186.4021 343341.3396 344740.2097
60 327067.5058 332101.8534 334361.2055 336456.6100 340184.2773 343334.6966 344735.5713
65 327067.0705 332104.9038 334361.1971 336453.4750 340184.5755 343362.6875 344709.8967
70 327069.7771 332103.7534 334361.0462 336454.4971 340188.1798 343306.5737 344783.1525
75 327066.6303 332103.2467 334361.1781 336455.4766 340183.5057 343346.9061 344732.3445
HS 327067.9956 332103.3744 334360.6760 336454.9308 340184.0037 343346.9077 344732.3398
XS 2803701.0193 2755565.4529 2731968.0744 2708681.4722 2663030.4870 2618590.1711 2596816.2933
Note: r is the discount rate and all efficient harvests are determined by GAMS. HS and XS are the steady-state harvest
(in tons/year) and stock (in tons), respectively, determined by MATHEMATICA.Rowse 262
Table 7
Performance Measures for the Base Case
Social Harvest Path Optimal for Discount Rate Specified
Discount
Rate 1% 3% 4% 5% 7% 9% 10%
1% SW=526.859 SW=526.323 SW=525.684 SW=524.821 SW=522.490 SW=519.452 SW=517.702
(0.00E+0) (–1.02E–1) (–2.23E–1) (–3.87E–1) (–8.29E–1) (–1.41E+0) (–1.74E+0)
CS=193.976 CS=200.080 CS=202.858 CS=205.461 CS=210.159 CS=214.215 CS=216.017
(0.00E+0) (3.15E+0) (4.58E+0) (5.92E+0) (8.34E+0) (1.04E+1) (1.14E+1)
PS=332.883 PS=326.244 PS=322.825 PS=319.360 PS=312.331 PS=305.237 PS=301.685
(0.00E+0) (–1.99E+0) (–3.02E+0) (–4.06E+0) (–6.17E+0) (–8.30E+0) (–9.37E+0)
3% SW=165.603 SW=165.784 SW=165.743 SW=165.621 SW=165.163 SW=164.453 SW=164.016
(–1.09E–1) (0.00E+0) (–2.53E–2) (–9.86E–2) (–3.75E–1) (–8.03E–1) (–1.07E+0)
CS=59.423 CS=61.356 CS=62.244 CS=63.081 CS=64.608 CS=65.948 CS=66.552
(–3.15E+0) (0.00E+0) (1.45E+0) (2.81E+0) (5.30E+0) (7.49E+0) (8.47E+0)
PS=106.180 PS=104.429 PS=103.499 PS=102.540 PS=100.554 PS=98.505 PS=97.465
(1.68E+0) (0.00E+0) (–8.91E–1) (–1.81E+0) (–3.71E+0) (–5.67E+0) (–6.67E+0)
4% SW=120.772 SW=121.041 SW=121.072 SW=121.042 SW=120.816 SW=120.395 SW=120.121
(–2.48E–1) (–2.62E–2) (0.00E+0) (–2.48E–2) (–2.12E–1) (–5.59E–1) (–7.86E–1)
CS=42.804 CS=44.222 CS=44.877 CS=45.496 CS=46.632 CS=47.637 CS=48.092
(–4.62E+0) (–1.46E+0) (0.00E+0) (1.38E+0) (3.91E+0) (6.15E+0) (7.17E+0)
PS=77.968 PS=76.819 PS=76.195 PS=75.546 PS=74.184 PS=72.758 PS=72.029
(2.33E+0) (8.18E–1) (0.00E+0) (–8.52E–1) (–2.64E+0) (–4.51E+0) (–5.47E+0)
5% SW=94.028 SW=94.347 SW=94.422 SW=94.446 SW=94.357 SW=94.108 SW=93.930
(–4.43E–1) (–1.05E–1) (–2.55E–2) (0.00E+0) (–9.43E–2) (–3.58E–1) (–5.46E–1)
CS=32.926 CS=34.038 CS=34.554 CS=35.044 CS=35.947 CS=36.752 CS=37.120
(–6.05E+0) (–2.87E+0) (–1.40E+0) (0.00E+0) (2.58E+0) (4.87E+0) (5.92E+0)
PS=61.102 PS=60.309 PS=59.867 PS=59.402 PS=58.409 PS=57.355 PS=56.811
(2.86E+0) (1.53E+0) (7.84E–1) (0.00E+0) (–1.67E+0) (–3.45E+0) (–4.36E+0)
7% SW=63.757 SW=64.130 SW=64.253 SW=64.337 SW=64.401 SW=64.343 SW=64.275
(–9.99E–1) (–4.20E–1) (–2.30E–1) (–9.93E–2) (0.00E+0) (–8.91E–2) (–1.95E–1)
CS=21.813 CS=22.581 CS=22.941 CS=23.285 CS=23.925 CS=24.505 CS=24.772
(–8.83E+0) (–5.62E+0) (–4.11E+0) (–2.68E+0) (0.00E+0) (2.42E+0) (3.54E+0)
PS=41.944 PS=41.549 PS=41.311 PS=41.052 PS=40.475 PS=39.838 PS=39.502
(3.63E+0) (2.65E+0) (2.07E+0) (1.42E+0) (0.00E+0) (–1.57E+0) (–2.40E+0)
9% SW=47.207 SW=47.605 SW=47.751 SW=47.866 SW=48.011 SW=48.056 SW=48.045
(–1.77E+0) (–9.38E–1) (–6.33E–1) (–3.94E–1) (–9.30E–2) (0.00E+0) (–2.14E–2)
CS=15.797 CS=16.378 CS=16.653 CS=16.917 CS=17.414 CS=17.869 CS=18.082
(–1.16E+1) (–8.35E+0) (–6.81E+0) (–5.33E+0) (–2.55E+0) (0.00E+0) (1.19E+0)
PS=31.410 PS=31.227 PS=31.099 PS=30.949 PS=30.597 PS=30.186 PS=29.963
(4.05E+0) (3.45E+0) (3.02E+0) (2.53E+0) (1.36E+0) (0.00E+0) (–7.39E–1)
10% SW=41.493 SW=41.898 SW=42.052 SW=42.177 SW=42.348 SW=42.427 SW=42.436
(–2.22E+0) (–1.27E+0) (–9.05E–1) (–6.11E–1) (–2.08E–1) (–2.18E–2) (0.00E+0)
CS=13.737 CS=14.254 CS=14.499 CS=14.736 CS=15.183 CS=15.596 CS=15.789
(–1.30E+1) (–9.73E+0) (–8.17E+0) (–6.67E+0) (–3.84E+0) (–1.23E+0) (0.00E+0)
PS=27.756 PS=27.644 PS=27.553 PS=27.441 PS=27.165 PS=26.831 PS=26.647
(4.16E+0) (3.74E+0) (3.40E+0) (2.98E+0) (1.94E+0) (6.92E–1) (0.00E+0)
Notes: SW = Social Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, PS = Producer Surplus Social. All performance measures are in
millions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the optimal solution for the social
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Table 8
Efficient Harvests for the Lower Intrinsic Growth Rate Case (Tons/Year)
Year  r: 1% 3% 4% 5% 7% 9% 10%
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 967.2639
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 13653.4857 25608.4355
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 10935.1763 34815.4927 43796.2882
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3891.6697 32692.4624 50855.0918 57665.7282
8 0.0000 0.0000 10817.0778 27253.4143 49379.2831 63286.9369 68447.5462
9 0.0000 16454.9935 32520.0746 45262.3320 62415.0736 73058.7776 76935.6984
10 0.0000 36829.2347 49391.5394 59369.0789 72718.5854 80812.6593 83675.5303
11 23614.6723 52747.2338 62668.4078 70532.4508 80927.4059 87006.5692 89060.0049
12 42124.0147 65303.0003 73200.7213 79427.6910 87504.3748 91978.3238 93381.6565
13 56621.7890 75270.8781 81602.6139 86551.1859 92795.7032 95983.3858 96861.5627
14 68049.3362 83220.1003 88331.7986 92276.3345 97065.9293 99219.1662 99671.8363
15 77096.6474 89580.7415 93737.5207 96889.2538 100520.3287 101839.1424 101945.4378
16 84282.4789 94682.7058 98089.9090 100614.8775 103319.8846 103963.4978 103787.9039
17 90003.4101 98782.6836 101600.1736 103628.3176 105591.9906 105689.0086 105282.9816
18 94566.1999 102083.1202 104435.1361 106068.5944 107438.1735 107091.1633 106497.3464
19 98210.2280 104742.3749 106727.1934 108046.4480 108939.6014 108232.0451 107484.7061
20 101124.0097 106886.2762 108581.7697 109652.0326 110161.5406 109161.5671 108287.7276
21 103455.3934 108617.2814 110083.3508 110955.2601 111156.6016 109917.7981 108941.1188
22 105321.9781 110015.1843 111299.8812 112013.2026 111967.2596 110533.8794 109473.1255
23 106817.1754 111144.5746 112285.8351 112871.7071 112628.0096 111036.7609 109906.5809
24 108017.3443 112054.3616 113085.2417 113571.2058 113166.6367 111446.9351 110259.4649
25 108977.0073 112794.0259 113733.1927 114140.9237 113605.9733 111781.1477 110547.3676
26 109746.1065 113391.3353 114259.3493 114602.7980 113964.1420 112053.8183 110781.7016
27 110367.0469 113871.4236 114685.4868 114977.3791 114256.6025 112276.9908 110972.7531
28 110863.4320 114261.9473 115032.5376 115283.1646 114494.7517 112458.0603 111128.6097
29 111258.0991 114578.7587 115312.0991 115532.7992 114689.4751 112605.9773 111255.6063
30 111577.4648 114832.7348 115541.5198 115734.3513 114848.8527 112727.2878 111359.4469
35 112444.5834 115540.9660 116177.6870 116304.1657 115298.1423 113072.0153 111651.5597
40 112731.3243 115785.2876 116401.7176 116504.7738 115460.3505 113193.7675 111749.2615
45 112828.9602 115870.3177 116480.6832 116579.1173 115519.7912 113240.3894 111796.3643
50 112860.9223 115899.1580 116507.4416 116599.9704 115542.8037 113257.3259 111823.6171
55 112871.3951 115911.1479 116519.0340 116612.1214 115552.4065 113265.0060 111801.2022
60 112874.8986 115915.5110 116521.6259 116620.7955 115553.4914 113260.6264 111809.3132
65 112875.9307 115916.8022 116523.9055 116616.2008 115556.6051 113254.7862 111821.9721
70 112877.4189 115916.6586 116524.2666 116617.6050 115538.2870 113287.2174 111866.1029
75 112875.4822 115914.7600 116523.3184 116622.0581 115553.2560 113264.5994 111816.7066
HS 112876.6934 115915.9220 116523.8334 116618.9159 115553.3676 113264.6936 111817.2231
XS 2406063.0808 2213082.9083 2121873.6397 2034482.2668 1871918.3754 1726568.5700 1660522.4325
Notes: r is the discount rate and all efficient harvests are determined by GAMS. HS and XS are the steady-state harvest
(in tons/year) and stock (in tons), respectively, determined by MATHEMATICA.Rowse 264
Table 9
Performance Measures for the Lower Intrinsic Growth Rate Case
Social Harvest Path Optimal for Discount Rate Specified
Discount
Rate 1% 3% 4% 5% 7% 9% 10%
1% SW=186.303 SW=183.569 SW=180.432 SW=176.367 SW=166.138 SW=154.210 SW=147.977
(0.00E+0) (–1.47E+0) (–3.15E+0) (–5.33E+0) (–1.08E+1) (–1.72E+1) (–2.06E+1)
CS= 20.598 CS= 22.045 CS= 22.432 CS= 22.624 CS= 22.494 CS= 21.872 CS= 21.445
(0.00E+0) (7.02E+0) (8.91E+0) (9.83E+0) (9.21E+0) (6.19E+0) (4.11E+0)
PS=165.706 PS=161.524 PS=158.000 PS=153.744 PS=143.644 PS=132.338 PS=126.532
(0.00E+0) (–2.52E+0) (–4.65E+0) (–7.22E+0) (–1.33E+1) (–2.01E+1) (–2.36E+1)
3% SW= 47.514 SW= 48.252 SW= 48.087 SW= 47.623 SW= 45.960 SW= 43.603 SW= 42.272
(–1.53E+0) (0.00E+0) (–3.42E–1) (–1.30E+0) (–4.75E+0) (–9.63E+0) (–1.24E+1)
CS=5.052 CS= 5.569 CS=5.746 CS=5.875 CS=5.989 CS=5.962 CS=5.915
(–9.28E+0) (0.00E+0) (3.18E+0) (5.49E+0) (7.55E+0) (7.06E+0) (6.21E+0)
PS= 42.462 PS= 42.683 PS= 42.341 PS= 41.748 PS= 39.971 PS= 37.642 PS= 36.357
(–5.18E–1) (0.00E+0) (–8.01E–1) (–2.19E+0) (–6.35E+0) (–1.18E+1) (–1.48E+1)
4% SW= 31.303 SW= 32.272 SW= 32.384 SW= 32.280 SW= 31.529 SW= 30.236 SW= 29.459
(–3.34E+0) (–3.45E–1) (0.00E+0) (–3.20E–1) (–2.64E+0) (–6.63E+0) (–9.03E+0)
CS=3.267 CS= 3.655 CS=3.797 CS=3.909 CS=4.034 CS=4.063 CS=4.054
(–1.40E+1) (–3.75E+0) (0.00E+0) (2.94E+0) (6.25E+0) (6.99E+0) (6.76E+0)
PS= 28.036 PS= 28.617 PS= 28.587 PS= 28.371 PS= 27.494 PS= 26.173 PS= 25.406
(–1.93E+0) (1.07E–1) (0.00E+0) (–7.53E–1) (–3.82E+0) (–8.44E+0) (–1.11E+1)
5% SW= 22.055 SW= 23.082 SW= 23.321 SW= 23.397 SW= 23.126 SW= 22.416 SW= 21.948
(–5.74E+0) (–1.35E+0) (–3.23E–1) (0.00E+0) (–1.16E+0) (–4.19E+0) (–6.19E+0)
CS=2.261 CS= 2.566 CS=2.685 CS=2.782 CS=2.907 CS=2.961 CS=2.971
(–1.87E+1) (–7.76E+0) (–3.51E+0) (0.00E+0) (4.49E+0) (6.43E+0) (6.80E+0)
PS= 19.794 PS= 20.516 PS= 20.636 PS= 20.614 PS= 20.219 PS= 19.455 PS= 18.976
(–3.98E+0) (–4.79E–1) (1.06E–1) (0.00E+0) (–1.92E+0) (–5.63E+0) (–7.95E+0)
7% SW= 12.306 SW= 13.271 SW= 13.592 SW= 13.811 SW= 13.978 SW= 13.836 SW= 13.678
(–1.20E+1) (–5.06E+0) (–2.76E+0) (–1.19E+0) (0.00E+0) (–1.01E+0) (–2.15E+0)
CS=1.219 CS=1.424 CS=1.511 CS=1.587 CS=1.699 CS=1.770 CS=1.795
(–2.83E+1) (–1.61E+1) (–1.11E+1) (–6.59E+0) (0.00E+0) (4.17E+0) (5.69E+0)
PS= 11.088 PS= 11.846 PS= 12.081 PS= 12.225 PS= 12.279 PS= 12.067 PS= 11.882
(–9.70E+0) (–3.53E+0) (–1.61E+0) (–4.47E–1) (0.00E+0) (–1.73E+0) (–3.23E+0)
9% SW=7.542 SW= 8.379 SW=8.698 SW=8.950 SW=9.272 SW=9.369 SW=9.348
(–1.95E+1) (–1.06E+1) (–7.16E+0) (–4.47E+0) (–1.04E+0) (0.00E+0) (–2.25E–1)
CS=0.723 CS= 0.870 CS=0.935 CS=0.995 CS=1.091 CS=1.162 CS=1.192
(–3.78E+1) (–2.51E+1) (–1.95E+1) (–1.44E+1) (–6.09E+0) (0.00E+0) (2.56E+0)
PS=6.819 PS= 7.509 PS=7.763 PS=7.955 PS=8.180 PS=8.207 PS=8.156
(–1.69E+1) (–8.50E+0) (–5.41E+0) (–3.07E+0) (–3.22E–1) (0.00E+0) (–6.19E–1)
10% SW=6.044 SW= 6.814 SW=7.121 SW=7.373 SW=7.726 SW=7.887 SW=7.905
(–2.35E+1) (–1.38E+1) (–9.92E+0) (–6.74E+0) (–2.26E+0) (–2.29E–1) (0.00E+0)
CS=0.570 CS= 0.696 CS=0.753 CS=0.807 CS=0.895 CS=0.964 CS=0.994
(–4.26E+1) (–2.99E+1) (–2.42E+1) (–1.88E+1) (–9.89E+0) (–3.01E+0) (0.00E+0)
PS=5.474 PS=6.118 PS=6.367 PS=6.565 PS=6.831 PS=6.923 PS=6.911
(–2.08E+1) (–1.15E+1) (–7.87E+0) (–5.00E+0) (–1.16E+0) (1.71E–1) (0.00E+0)
Notes: SW = Social Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, PS = Producer Surplus. All performance measures are in mil-
lions of dollars. Figures in parentheses are percentage changes relative to the optimal solution for the social discount
rate listed.